What is Thinking? Concepts, Judgments and Perception in Kantian Perspective (PL)

My main aim is to answer the question regarding the relationship between concepts and sensuous cognition on the basis of Kant’s critical philosophy. I argue that concepts are a part of sensuous experience. The key question regarding the shape of this relation and the way concepts interconnect with sensibility are formulated in terms of the so-called rule-following problem that I try to resolve with reference to the function of the so-called power of judgment and Kant’s Third Critique.  

I argue that the Kantian answer to the rule-following problem is not based only on the rejection of the necessity of a metaphysical criterion, since concepts and intuitions are epistemologically indiscriminable, and the rejection of an epistemological criterion, since the possibility of cognition and meaning presupposes a subjective feeling of agreement between singular and general representations. I claim that the possibility of rule-following presupposes having an ability to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant rules.